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The Search for a

Autonomy and

Massachusetts

Politics in

Chancellor:

Education

Higher

Richard A. Hogarty

Political scientists

have not devoted much attention

to the politics

hard to explain since the material for study

of higher education.

hand and the
ample research opportunities. The search for a chancellor conducted by the
Massachusetts Board of Regents in 1986 aroused considerable public attention and conTheir reluctance

is

is

close at

subject offers

troversy. This case study examines that controversy along with the tensions that arise when
academic and political forces collide. Few searches in academia are perfect and none is a
morality play This one proved to be no exception. This article is an attempt to reconstruct

the controversy

and explain

its

causes and consequences.

Trying to keep education free ofpolitics
this central

is

a favorite theme of reformers. In exploring

theme, the author finds that theory often crumbles in the face of unpredictable

He emphasizes the hard choices that the participants had to make amidst their

events.

continuous efforts to resolve dilemmas. The underlying argument that higher education
is

so technical and professional that only a professional educator can manage

it is

also examined.
in state government, the Board of Regents — like any other
— has to concern itself with political realities. If the governor

As an independent agency
actor in the political game

has political power, the agency may "knuckle under"

agency

will probably turn elsewhere to seek the

to

support

him;

it

if he lacks power, the

needs to sustain

itself in the

and patronage and the authority to expand operations or to
grow in personnel and importance. Better communication between the Regents and the
competitive world of budgets

political leadership is necessary to avoid the repetition

Among
age

is

of such

conflict.

the threats to the viability of American education that

seem

to

the challenge to the public university. Retaining the ability to

autonomous decisions

is

of critical importance to

its

abound

make

in

fair

our

and

operation. Inappropriate political

interference with line authority in the governance of higher education threatens that inde-

pendence. The threat
In delivering the

is a grave one because it goes to the heart of the academic enterprise.
Askwith Lecture at Harvard in 1986, Clifton Wharton, then chancellor

Richard A. Hogarty is a professor ofpolitical science who teaches courses in state and local government at
the University of Massachusetts at Boston. He has served on various search committees, including those for
chancellor, provost, and dean at the Boston campus.

New England Journal of Public Policy

Chronology, 1985-1986
December 10

Chancellor Duff resigns; search committee appointed.

January 8

Search committee meets with governor and obtains commitment from him to
press for early legislation to increase the chancellor's salary.

February 11

Board of Regents adopts procedural resolution to abide by search committee's
recommendations.

March 15

Application deadline; 107 candidates apply.

March 27
April

3

Pay

raise

(H-5474)

bill

filed.

Screening subcommittee recommends 32 candidates.

on pay

April 16

Public hearing

April 17

Search committee narrows

May 2-3

First

May 6

Pay raise bill
Committee.

May 14

raise

bill

(H-5474).

field to

12 candidates.

round of candidate interviews.
in

new form

(H-5639) reported favorably by the Public Service

Ylvisaker alerts Board of Regents that search committee will not be able to report
candidates on June 9 as originally planned.

final selection of

May 22
June 9

Search committee makes penultimate cut and reduces

field to

6 candidates.

Board of Regents attempts to abandon search but instead authorizes a
of 6 finalists.

maximum
June 12-18

Second round
raise

June 19
July

1

bill

of candidate interviews. Speaker Keverian refuses to advance pay
unless Collins appears among the finalists.

Search committee selects 4 finalists; Collins eliminated.

Board of Regents ignores 4 finalists and elects Collins as
Ylvisaker resigns

in

new chancellor;

protest.

July 2

Governor intervenes in dispute, replaces Regents chairman Beaubien with
Lashman, and announces his intention to overturn the Board of Regents'
decision. House of Representatives unanimously endorses Collins as chancellor.

July 3

Governor contacts Collins and warns him not to resign from
proceed on present course.

July 6

Boston Globe breaks story that
campaign fundraiser.

Collins

July 7

Eisner resigns from Board of Regents

July 8

Collins rejects

July 10

Collins

July 18

Six Regents

asked Duff to

in

legislature or to

sell tickets

to Speaker's

protest of Collins's appointment.

90-day contract offered by Lashman.

appears on television to argue
call for

special

his case.

meeting of Board to act on

stalled contract

negotiations.

July

24

Seven Regents ask attorney general to

July

25

Attorney general rules Collins legally elected but serves
Regents.

July 31

August 5

rule

on

legality of Collins

appointment.

at pleasure of

Board of

Governor appoints three new Regents and gains control of the Board.
Board of Regents reopens search and denies Collins one-year performance
contract.

August 18

Newell drops out of

September 9

Board of Regents

race, claiming

fires Collins

atmosphere too

politicized.

and elects Jenifer as new

chancellor.

Members and Terms of Office
Massachusetts Board of Regents of Higher Education, 1986
Appointees of Governor Edward King
*David J. Beaubien (1980-1988)
^Nicholas Boraski (1982-1992)
Gerard F. Doherty (1982-1987)
Janet Eisner (1980-1986)
*George Ellison (1980-1982)
(1985-1990)
*J. John Fox (1981-1989)
James Howell (1982-1986)
David Paresky (1980-1986)
^Elizabeth B. Rawlins (1980-1982)
(1984-1988)
Edward T. Sullivan (1982-1987)
^Initially

**lnitially

Appointees of Governor Michael Dukakis
Mary Lou Anderson (1984-1989)
Paul S. Doherty (1986-1991)

CGuiney (1986-1991)
Kathleen Harrington (1984-1988)
Joe M. Henson (1986-1991)
L Edward Lashman (1986-1990)
Paul Marks (1984-1990)
Norma Markey, student member (1986-1987)
Hassan Minor (1984-1989)
Paul N. Ylvisaker (1984-1986)
Ellen

appointed by King and reappointed by Dukakis.
appointed by King and then appointed by Dukakis.

of the state higher education system in

New York,

explained the crux of the problem:

"Public colleges and universities are identical to their counterparts in the independent
sector in having no

margin of tolerance

for political quid pro quo.

That which compro-

mises the integrity of their administration and governance also compromises the integrity
of their teaching, research, and service.

It is

a short step to

making

faculty appointments

or awarding tenure on the basis of political persuasion and ideological preference." Edu1

cators therefore tend to take a very

munity, where

freedom and

it is

dim view of political

intrusion into the academic

com-

seen as an infringement of the cherished principles of academic

institutional

autonomy.

In legal terms, public colleges and universities are creatures of the state.

As

such, they

operate in a political environment that makes them accountable to the public and at the

same time exposes them

to steady external pressures.

publicly funded institution
larly,

the

ought to

is

One can argue that influence over a

appropriate in achieving democratic responsibility. Simi-

argument can be made that a university, like a hospital or a motor vehicle office,
be autonomous. In reality, however, no university, whether public or private,

enjoys complete autonomy. Both are subject to the constraints imposed by government

funding and to the decisions handed

down by

state

and federal courts. In the public do-

main, the boundaries between democratic accountability and academic autonomy are not
always clearly defined. Most controversies in state higher education involve the clash of
these competing demands. 2

For higher education as a whole, the issue of autonomy arises when a new chief executive officer is

being hired. The differences between the public and private sectors are

revealing. Hiring a president at a private university

New England schools

such as

names of their candidates nor keep
is

assured.

By

customarily shrouded in secrecy.
for example, neither reveal the

the outside world informed of the progress of the

search. Furthermore, formal offers are not

ceptance

is

Brown and Dartmouth,
made to

qualified prospects unless their ac-

sharp contrast, public institutions operate virtually in a glass

house when performing the same function. Something more
of campus executives in the public sector

is at

is

involved.

The recruitment

best a delicate and arduous task, as various

its own agenda seek to become active if not predominant
Such searches must be done in compliance with affirmative
action rules and with the requirements of "open meeting" laws, which are designed to

groups and individuals each with
in the selection process.

ensure accountability. Studies indicate that in states such as Florida, such laws (sometimes
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referred to as "sunshine legislation")
the

most qualified people. Preserving
3

may be more

of a hindrance than a help in attracting

confidentiality, as the private sector well

often the key to a successful search. Candidates for the job do not want their

died about for fear of jeopardizing their current positions.
the post, such disclosure

may

And

if

knows,

is

names ban-

they are not accepted for

impair their future opportunities elsewhere. The courts

generally recognize certain privacy rights of the individual placed in such circumstances.

Balancing these rights against the obligations of sunshine laws

is

indeed a difficult and

perplexing exercise.

Procedures are normally adopted to protect the confidentiality of the candidates and to

guard against the impact of publicity and the cruder forms of direct interference. Even the

most elaborate procedures, however, do not necessarily guarantee such protection. Leaks
and other premature disclosures are almost bound to occur. 4 Public awareness

to the press

of the candidates

is

unavoidable

at a certain point.

dynamic tensions among the competing
this

interests,

Since the selection process involves
it

may

well

become

politicized.

Once

happens, the politics of the search run a course similar to the politics of any other

controversial dispute in a democratic society.

ment and build

a coalition of influence to get

Some people want something from
it,

govern-

while other people want something differ-

ent and build a countervailing coalition to block or modify the design of the first group.

Compelled to conduct its educational business in a highly charged political atmosphere, a
search committee may stray from its proper course, despite its best efforts and intentions.
Perhaps there is no better illustration of this phenomenon than the search for a chancellor of higher education in Massachusetts in 1986. During the first six months of that year,
the state Board of Regents conducted a national search for a new chancellor to head its
public higher education system. Before long, the search developed into a fierce power
struggle both inside and outside the Board. The media seized on it. Powerful forces
some obvious, some subtle
exerted tremendous pressures in their attempts to influence
the outcome. Much of the politics and press attention focused on James Collins, a state
representative from Amherst and an erstwhile supporter of public higher education, who
became a central figure in the struggle. Bypassing the four finalists that their search had
produced, the Regents appointed Collins as chancellor and thereby invoked a storm of
protest. The fact that they had picked a state legislator rather than a professional educator
did not sit well with Governor Michael Dukakis and his followers. Dukakis opposed the

—

—

Collins appointment. Claiming that the selection process had been seriously flawed, the

governor intervened in the dispute and proceeded to pack the sixteen-member Board of

Regents with a new chairman and three new members who were favorably disposed to his
own position. By so doing, he was able to get the Board of Regents to reconsider the Collins

appointment and to remove Collins from office. Meanwhile, Speaker of the House

George Keverian

criticized the governor's intervention

and vigorously defended Collins.

Subsequently, the realigned Board ousted Collins and chose Franklyn Jenifer, a black

educator from

New Jersey and a previous

finalist.

Values and vested interests were

at

stake as well as pride and ambition.

The chancellor search controversy must be understood
political

in the context of a very

complex

system involving history, culture, personalities, institutional arrangements, spe-

cial interests,

and ethnic group participation. To be sure, the

chusetts colors

all

aspects of its institutional

level of higher education, highlighting

demic and

political interests.

prietary attitude toward

its

Over

life,

political culture of

Massa-

including the most rarefied and lofty

perhaps more than simply a division between aca-

time, politicians in the

Bay State have adopted a proThey regard them as their

public colleges and universities.

10

prized possessions,

if

not their

own creations. To use the parlance

"own" them. Some of these

tors, they

addition, the higher education system

institutions

had become

was a patronage haven

of Beacon Hill legisla-

legislators' fiefdoms. In

for several ex-legislators.

Unless one understands these dynamics, one cannot fully comprehend or appreciate the
particulars of this specific case.

In

many

respects, the

been going on

in

main

battle over the search for a chancellor reflected

Massachusetts higher education for the past twenty years

between the traditional

politics of the Irish

and the new

also set in motion the bifactionalism within the state
vative

Ed King Democrats

against liberal

what has

— a struggle

politics of insurgent reformers.

Democratic party

It

that pitted conser-

Mike Dukakis Democrats and the

legislative

and

executive branches of state government against each other. Urban-rural rivalries and

who

favored centralization of the

favored decentralization.

Among the latter were those

other old antagonisms were rekindled between those

system

who

in

Boston and those

who

sought to restore UMass/Amherst to

its

once preeminent position. The controversy

was further aggravated by the enduring tension between public and private
higher learning. Indeed, the
ber,

elite private institutions, especially

have always enjoyed center stage,

much to the

public sector. Before the main battle ended,

it

institutions of

those of world-class cali-

chagrin and intense jealousy of the

was transformed

into a public versus private

skirmish with the trappings of an Irish-Harvard, town-and-gown confrontation.

drama, Regent James Howell was accused of a conflict of interest
Commission in arguing against the approval of a graduate nursing
program at UMass/Boston. The new program would be competing with a financially
troubled one at Boston University, where Howell served as a trustee. Although he actually
abstained from voting on the issue, he was nonetheless charged with a conflict. As a consequence, legislation was passed that clarified the relationship between the law establishing the Board of Regents and the law establishing the Ethics Commission. The matter
did not end here, however. The legislation was promptly vetoed by the governor, and the
governor's veto, which evoked additional public criticism from Speaker Keverian,

To add

by the

was

to the political

state Ethics

later

overridden by the General Court. But the furor over this effort to censure and

then to exonerate Howell took a back seat to the controversy sparked by the effort to

remove

Collins.

All of this activity occurred in 1986 while the newly created Board of Regents was
struggling to organize itself and define

by the

intricate political

its

role.

still

For the most part the public was baffled

game being played at the

State House. Public opinion

on the gov-

Some people
governor
who
incumbent
for an

ernor's handling of the chancellor search controversy was strongly divided.

looked on the whole affair as smart politics, especially
was currently seeking reelection and planning to run for the U.S. presidency in 1988.
Others viewed it as a manipulative exercise of power that was as blatant as it was transparent, and of doubtful legality as well. Still others were too confused by the Board of Regents' overturning of its original decision to

know

quite

what

to

make

of it. Before the

themselves felt that something had gone wrong. My
own recollections are those of an interested faculty member who viewed the dispute from

political flak abated, the participants

The account that follows is based primarily on the public record and
on personal interviews obtained from the principal participants. 5
On the assumption that a look backward may illuminate the way ahead, I will examine
the central issue of process and analyze why things went awry. Inevitably mistakes were
made, and those were mostly procedural. Some of the troubles were systemic and thus
unavoidable. Others were not, but something like them could have been predicted by
a discreet distance.

11
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considering the difficulty the Regents had encountered in their search for a chancellor in

1981

.

(More about

that

botched effort will be discussed shortly.) Anyone looking

events that took place in 1986 cannot adequately explain

why

at the

they occurred without rais-

ing a set of deeper questions.

What was

the nature of the decision process itself?

pants bring with them?

What preconceptions

did the partici-

How did their perceptions play against each other? Under what

sort of pressures

were they operating? In what specific ways was the process flawed?

What midcourse

corrective measures were at their disposal?

way

as to reduce their

own autonomy?

If the Collins forces

Did

the Regents act in such a

could control the Regents,

could they not also shape a search committee to serve their interests?

about that the anti-Collins faction depended on the search committee to achieve
while the pro-Collins group relied on the Regents to do

so,

why

How did it come
its

when the former was

ends

a crea-

Answering these kinds of illuminating questions should shed light on
what actually happened. The questions, of course, answer themselves much more clearly
ture of the latter?

after the fact than before.

My list is far from complete. Many other questions may need to

be asked and answered. Even

ways

in

so, this

approach

which key actors saw the episode and

The Struggle

for

at least takes into

their roles in

account the different

it.

Autonomy

American public higher education originated in Massachusetts in the late 1830s, when
Horace Mann departed from the General Court to become the state's first secretary of
education. An educator of great vision, Mann presided over numerous reforms, including
the establishment of a series of normal schools to train teachers. These were the prototype
public colleges. In 1862, the U.S. Congress passed the Morrill Act, which gave land
grants to each state for establishing colleges to train students in agriculture and mechanics. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology accepted the mechanical training mandate
of this federal program. To address the other mandate, a state college of agriculture was
created in Amherst in 1863.
Before the Civil War, Massachusetts was largely rural, Yankee Protestant, and agricultural. By the turn of the century, it had become largely urban and industrial and increasingly Catholic. The public colleges met these new social realities as best they could, but
they competed with an illustrious array of private institutions that benefited greatly from
the windfall of capitalist philanthropy. Bridging the gap between them was costly, and the
public colleges suffered as a result. Subjected to benign neglect, they were starved financially

and abused

politically.

The hegemony of the independent sector explains in large measure why Massachusetts
to provide more generous support for public higher education. Under these
circumstances, the state college of agriculture at Amherst remained small in size and
stature. It did not achieve university status until 1947, when its enrollment still hovered
was so slow

between two and three thousand students. At

that time,

it

land grant schools in the midwestern and western states.
to play catch-up

and

to

paled by comparison to the large

"Mass Aggie," however, yearned

emulate states like California, Ohio, Michigan, and Indiana, which

had a healthy mixture of strong private

institutions

and eminent public

universities.

But

change came slowly. During the 1950s, Governor Foster Furculo championed the establishment of a network of community colleges. Despite
smaller proportion of

its

its

success, Massachusetts sent a

high school students on to college than any other state except

12

Maine and

Mississippi. Lacking the prestige and financial clout of their distinguished

private counterparts, the public institutions suffered

from an

inferiority

complex, consid-

ering themselves as second best. This attitude, which was rooted in historical develop-

ments, persists to some extent today.

By the early 1960s, conditions began to change sharply. The era of the Great Society,
which witnessed greater federal involvement in and funding of higher education, marked
a decisive turning point in the evolution of public higher education in the Bay State. DurUMass/Amherst soared to 23,000 students, and more than
accommodate them. Capital outlay funds at the
state university rose from $1.6 million to $89.8 million. New campuses were created at
Boston in 1964 and at Worcester in 1968. The state built a medical school in Worcester
with federal assistance, and the new teaching hospital overlooking Lake Quinsigamond
was soon providing better care than had previously been available in the area. Mergers of
ing that decade, enrollment at

seventy

new

buildings were constructed to

small technical colleges led to the establishment of Southeastern Massachusetts University in

1969 and the University of Lowell in 1973. At the same time, the community col-

lege system

was expanded and the old normal schools were converted into modern liberal
New community colleges appeared in cities like Brockton and Lynn in the

arts colleges.

east

and

Pittsfield

Spearheading

and Springfield

this

in the west.

expansion drive were leading Irish Democratic politicians such as

Maurice Donahue, Kevin Harrington, Robert Quinn, and George Kenneally, who were all
close to the party's blue-collar base. Solving the problem of the 1960s with such dramatic
expansion required the combined efforts of both the executive and legislative branches.

What had happened? Apparently the demand had always been there. Why was the legislature now willing to meet that demand? Or, to put it somewhat differently, why did it take
the Irish so long to

explanation

is

commit public funds

satisfactory. Part of the

trolled the governorship

Civil
trol

to the education of their children?

answer

lies in the fact that the

and both houses of the

War to almost the middle of the twentieth

legislature, with

century.

No single

Republicans con-

few exceptions, from the

The Democrats did not gain con-

of the House of Representatives until 1948. They did not capture the Senate until

1958. Another part of the answer had to do with the dramatic transformation of Catholic
institutions

such as Boston College and Holy Cross, which began to recruit faculty and

Such private colleges became too expensive for middle-income and
more prohibitive were the skyrocketing tuition costs at the
private medical schools. Consequently, Senate President Donahue and Speaker Quinn
made increased funding a top legislative priority. In fact, it was mostly Boston College
students nationwide.

working-class families. Even

alumni on Beacon Hill who pushed for the creation of UMass/Boston. They saw it as a
way to pick up the slack in the private system and to service their blue-collar constituents.
UMass/Boston, dedicated to the pursuit of the liberal arts, was envisioned by its founding
faculty as the "Harvard for the working class."
With the passage of the landmark Willis-Harrington Act in 1965, the public sector won
considerable fiscal and institutional autonomy. As Robert Wood observes: "All through

was on a roll. Enrollments swelled as postwar baby boomers came of age. Federal support for research and development, the student aid programs of the Great Society, liberal state appropriations for public institutions,
and the first sizable endowment drives for many private ones provided sufficient and

the sixties, higher education in Massachusetts

occasionally ample resources. Civil-rights legislation released the pent-up college de-

mands

for minorities. Capital outlays for

new campuses, classrooms, and

13

laboratories
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were often authorized even before architects completed plans. The times were golden." 6

new informational age spawned by
computers was dawning. With the abundance of state and federal funding, the entire system prospered. Nothing since has matched that period of accomplishment.
Values and social demographics were changing. The

Creation of the Board of Regents

Those years of euphoria placated all but the most ardent proponents of expanded growth.
Regulating such growth and the way in which the public system was governed presented a
formidable challenge. Under the Willis-Harrington legislation, the system was loosely

organized into five "segments," with governance delegated to separate boards of lay

trust-

were coordinated by a central Board of Higher Education, whose primary functions were to develop a master plan and to review budgetary requests. But the
ees. Their efforts

Board of Higher Education never obtained from the

was
Board of Higher Education

legislature a budget or staff that

sufficient to carry out these responsibilities. Opposition to the

came mostly from UMass/Amherst, which did not want any state agency interfering with
its flagship status or with its plans to catch up with the more prestigious Big Ten state
universities.

Much of this resistance was engineered by Winthrop Dakin, an astute Yankee
who had opposed the creation of the Board of Higher Education.

attorney from Amherst,

Dakin wound up as its chairman. In this capacity, he implemented the Amherst
game plan, which was to keep the Board of Higher Education weak. The private sector,

Ironically,

which also desired
and abetted

that

to protect its

game

independence from the Board of Higher Education, aided

plan. 7

A succession of chancellors (Richard Millard, Patrick McCarthy, Leroy Keith, Edward
McGuire, and Laura Clausen), whose selection was embroiled in controversy, managed
Board of Higher Education. Keith, who later became president of Morehouse College
was the first black to head the commonwealth's system. In addition to its being
underfunded and understaffed, the Board of Higher Education was further compromised
in 1971 with the awkward presence of a secretary of educational affairs, a position that had
the

in Atlanta,

been established as part of an extensive reorganization of state government. This
tional

arrangement resulted

By the mid-1970s,

in substantial overlap of statutory authority

with the Arab

oil

embargo, soaring

and

inflation, general

institu-

responsibilities,

economic

uncertainty, and the first Dukakis administration imposing across-the-board funding cuts

cumbersome and stifling bureaucracy proved most unsatThe hegemony of the segmented boards not only resulted in a disparate set of

for public higher education, this
isfactory.

academic programs and duplication of effort but also replicated budget hearings
prone to internecine

battles in the competition for

what were now scarce

John Millett observed: "What had been demonstrated

in

that

state funds.

were

As

Massachusetts was the inability

of a state coordinating board and a secretary of education to bring about substantial
change." 8

who had succeeded Maurice Donahue as SenBoard of Higher Education with a better institutional arrangement. A special legislative commission headed by state Senator Walter
Boverini of Lynn was established in 1977 to study the problem, but its work was interAs

a result, Kevin Harrington of Salem,

ate president,

was anxious

to replace the

rupted by a gubernatorial election in 1978 that saw conservative Edward King defeat the
liberal

incumbent Michael Dukakis

his startling upset,

King went on

to

in a bitterly contested

Democratic primary. Buoyed by

win the governorship. Like

14

his

two predecessors

in the

.

corner office, King advocated the creation of a strong central governing board, but he
could not break through the stalemate of forces surrounding the reorganization of public
higher education. The main obstacle was James Collins. Strongly influenced by Winthrop

from Amherst, who chaired the House Education
to the idea of a central board. He saw it as a
major threat to the autonomy of UMass/Amherst. Although no Irish symbolism attaches
to the rural town of Amherst, nevertheless the flagship campus was located in his base of
Dakin, the young

state representative

Committee, remained vehemently opposed

political power.

From the mid to

late 1970s, Collins

succeeded

in

blocking a series of

9
reorganization proposals.

In the meantime,

it

took three governors (Francis Sargent, Dukakis, and King) to re-

structure public higher education and to streamline

Boverini commission submitted

its

Exasperated by such obstruction, the Irish

Thomas McGee, and Senate

bureaucracy. In

its

May

1980, the

recommendations were torpedoed.
Democratic troika of Governor King, Speaker

report, but

its

President William Bulger broke the stalemate and agreed to

enact major reform. (By this time, Bulger had succeeded Harrington in the top Senate
post.)

The

land. In

deal was supposedly struck while the three

what amounted

to

men were on a trip together in Ire-

an end run around Collins, they achieved the reform measure

by use of an "outside section" that was appended to the appropriations
Since the issue was resolved by a conference committee,

hearing or a floor debate. Hence, Collins could not
sentative

John Finnegan and

state

kill

it

bill for

FY81

did not require either a public

the measure. Both state Repre-

Senator Chester Atkins,

who chaired their respective

Ways and Means committees, were responsible for engineering this feat. What became
known as the Higher Education Reorganization Act of 1980 was thereby enacted.
The new law abolished the Board of Higher Education, the community college and state
college boards, and the position of secretary of educational affairs. These instrumentali-

were replaced by a powerful Board of Regents

was given both coordinating and
Board of Regents was made responsible for long-range planning, personnel policies, collective bargaining, and review
and approval of academic programs. In addition, it was made responsible for overseeing
ties

governing functions. Under

that

this strong legislation, the

the charters of independent degree-granting institutions in the private sector. All in

all,

the

Board of Regents was assigned the broad powers necessary for achieving unity and cohesion in what was then a highly fragmented and unwieldy system. 10 What this meant in
blunter language was that the authority of the central board would be increased at the
inevitable expense of the local boards.

By

Board of Regents was granted a seven-month transition pebecame operational. During this orderly transition, which extended from
August 1980 to March 1981, Paul Guzzi served as its temporary chancellor. He was secretary of state and a former state legislator from Newton. While he presided in an interim
capacity, the Board of Regents conducted a search for his permanent replacement. Guzzi
himself did not become a candidate. Worth momentary note is the fact that the search
committee in 1980-81 was composed exclusively of Regents. There were no outsiders.
The chancellor's salary was fixed by statute at $54,500, which proved to be a significant
drawback to attracting the best applicants. According to Regent George Ellison, everyone
entered the search expecting that the salary would be raised to $95,000. Four highly qualstatutory language, the

riod before

it

ified educators
at the

from out of state were selected

as finalists. Albert

Bowker, the chancellor

University of California at Berkeley, was the leading contender. But the Regents

were unable

to

persuade the General Court to increase the chancellor's

75

salary,

and none of

"
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the finalists

ended

would accept the job because of the low salary. Consequently, the first phase
Seven months of searching amounted to an exercise in futility. The

in stalemate.

search had to be reopened.

They were David Bartley, Kermit Morand Franklin Patterson. All three came from within Massachusetts. Morrissey was
the former president of Boston State College, and Patterson was the former president of
In the second phase, three contenders emerged.

rissey,

Hampshire College. The front-runner, Bartley, was no stranger to state politics. He was
House and the sitting president of Holyoke Community College.
The Regents rejected him because he came across in his interview more as a politician
the former speaker of the

than as an academic leader. They also failed to pick either Morrissey or Patterson. 12 In a

Duff was
and head of the Public Council of College and University Presidents and
as such was serving as academic adviser to the search committee. Although he apparently
surprise move, they drafted John Duff, president of the University of Lowell.

also the founder

some people resented the fact that he was an insider choice.
Duff was given a $10,500 salary increase, but
the additional compensation that he was promised was not forthcoming. He was a feisty
Irishman who proved to be very controversial. Despite questions from skeptics about his
abilities and policy initiatives, Duff provided strong leadership, especially in dealing
with systemic problems. But his management style was autocratic and confrontational. He
also frequently mixed politics and education. All of these traits eventually landed him
did not seek the job,

A transplanted New Jersey educator,

in trouble.

Among Duffs more notable accomplishments was the successful merger of Boston
State College with

UMass/Boston. More than anything

else, this

merger demonstrated

to

a tax-conscious public the willingness and determination of the Board of Regents to terminate programs that were no longer cost-effective.
local loyalties

1852, had powerful allies on Beacon Hill.
gents stuck to

Its

decision had an unpopular impact on

and aspirations, however. Boston State College, which had been founded

its

in

A hue and cry went up, but the Board of Re-

guns. In implementing the merger plan, the Regents acted as a buffer by

taking the political heat off the Boston legislative delegation for the demise of its state
teachers' college.

By

1986, the public system had grown huge and complex. Taken together,

passed three

state universities, nine state teachers' colleges,

leges, with a total enrollment of

it

encom-

and fifteen community

col-

180,000 students and a work force of 14,000 employees.

The Board of Regents chancellor administered a budget in excess of $700 million, which
included a $58 million scholarship program and a capital outlay plan. In addition, he
supervised a staff of seventy-two people and an office budget of $3 million. As the primary advocate for higher education, he was its most visible leader, both symbolically and
operationally. His continued effectiveness depended in large measure on his personal
style

and

his professional

competence.

Duff Resigns and Beaubien Appoints Search Committee

On December

10, 1985,

John Duff suddenly resigned as chancellor under the cloud of

allegations of improper political fundraising.

He had

sent a letter to the Regents soliciting

them to buy tickets to a $100-a-plate dinner that was given for the benefit of Speaker
George Keverian. Subsequently, the print media revealed that it was James Collins who
had asked Duff to sell the tickets. This solicitation, many State House observers believed,
was part of a larger scheme by Regent John Fox to rehabilitate Collins politically.
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After

Duffs

departure, the picture was further clouded by the revelation of a major sex

scandal that eventually led to the indictment of the president of Westf ield State College

and the payment of $10,000 as a legal settlement to the student involved. The fallout from
To add to the Board of Regents' administrative chaos and disar-

this affair radiated widely.

$2 million discrepancy was discovered in its computer account.
Gerard Indelicato, the governor's educational adviser, had a long-standing and bitter
feud with Duff that stemmed from a dispute over tuition policy. Duff distrusted Indelicato

ray, a

and had found him to be duplicitous

in dealing with the legislature.

Both men disliked each

other intensely. Indelicato saw the fundraising incident as the perfect excuse to oust Duff.

This was the precipitating event, as

we

shall see, that set of f a political chain reaction. In

Duff had warned Governor Dukakis about Indelicato.
Against the background of these mishaps, Board of Regents chairman David Beaubien
moved quickly to fill the leadership vacuum created by Duff's departure. Beaubien had
served on the Board since its inception in 1980. He was a senior vice president for a
high-technology firm (EG&G), where he was responsible for new business ventures.
A UMass/Amherst graduate in engineering, Beaubien lived in Montague in western Massachusetts. His residence was located within state Senator John Olver's district and near
James Collins 's district in Hampshire County.
At its December 10 meeting, which Regent Gerard F. Doherty missed, the Board of
Regents named Joseph Finnegan as the acting interim chancellor. Finnegan, whose
brother helped create the Board of Regents, came from a well-known political family in
Dorchester. He was not an academic. (Doherty, who soon became a major player in the
search, was a former state legislator and former chairman of the state Democratic party.
He had helped deliver Bunker Hill Community College, along with an MDC hockey rink,
to his predominantly Irish working-class constituency in Charlestown.) At the same meeting, the Board approved Beaubien 's appointment of an eleven-member search committee.
Unlike the original search committee, this one was composed of six Regents and five nonRegents. Since 1980, the Board of Regents had adopted a new policy governing searches
that followed a national model and called for adding outside people to meet the multiple
demands from the many constituencies within public higher education. The new policy
his turn, before leaving office

also specified that once the Regents delegated the screening function to a committee, they

could not resort to an alternative means for picking candidates.
Six of the Regents volunteered to serve on the search committee. Three of those were

chosen and three other Regents were drafted.

Of the volunteers,

Doherty, Howell, Har-

rington, and Sullivan turned out to be Collins supporters; Rawlins and

other two volunteers.

The

final

Minor were

the

Regent representation on the search committee consisted

of Mary

Lou Anderson, Janet Eisner, James Howell, Hassan Minor, Edward Sullivan, and
The non-Regents were Joyce King, a trustee at Roxbury Community College; David Knapp, president of UMass; Robert Lee, a faculty member at Fitchburg State
College; Laura Clausen, former Board of Higher Education chancellor who now served
Paul Ylvisaker.

on the Board of Regents

staff;

and Eileen Parise, a student trustee at Southeastern Massawas anticipated, and Beaubien received

chusetts University. Obviously, Duff's departure

help in producing these names.

He had consulted with Duff and with vice chancellors

Joseph Finnegan, Peter Mitchell, Roger Schinness, and Clare Van Ummersen. Staff

member Jan Robinson had recommended Eileen Parise.
There was no shortage of brains and knowledge among the people responsible for
screening candidates. Nor did they lack gender balance and ethnic diversity. There were
six men and five women. Nine of the eleven brought substantial experience in higher
13

17

.
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education, though from different vantage points, and the other two were a student and a

member of organized labor. There were two blacks and one Asian.
Paul Ylvisaker was asked to chair the search committee. He did not volunteer for the
assignment. As the former dean of the Harvard Graduate School of Education, he brought
with him both academic and political experience. In the mid to late 1960s, he had served

commissioner of community

as the first

affairs in

assignment Ylvisaker made his conditions known.

New Jersey.

reputation on the line, he insisted on conducting a fair

black academic

who had taught courses

Before accepting his new

was going to put his professional
and open search. 14 Hassan Minor, a

If he

in organizational behavior at

MIT, was chosen

vice chairman. Janet Eisner, president of Emmanuel College, was the only person

had served on the original search committee

in

as

who

1980-81

Probing Assumptions

The participants approached
tions based

their task with concerns and objectives colored by assumpon past experience. Even before the search had gotten under way, rumors

began circulating

that

James Collins had sufficient votes on the Board of Regents

to

win

the chancellorship. These rumors, which were not entirely without substance, created the

who wanted to
was busy lining up potential support. He discussed his candidacy at separate luncheon engagements with Mary Lou Anderson and David Knapp. Anderson, who lived in Worcester, belonged to several professional women's groups and
chaired the Regents' subcommittee on affirmative action. Such early maneuvering raised
impression that the outcome was predetermined. Meanwhile, Collins,

redeem

his political stature,

sensitivity

about whether there was to be a genuine search or merely the ratification of a

decision that already had been made.

Not

surprisingly, the participants soon divided into pro-

and anti-Collins camps. The

Collins backers saw the chancellor's job primarily in terms of generating legislative sup-

port for public higher education and obtaining the necessary funds to finance

it.

In 1984,

while lobbying for a salary increase for the chancellor, Regent Edward Sullivan discovered that John Duff had become persona non grata on Beacon Hill. 15 Duff's credibility

problem stemmed

in part

from what was widely perceived as

his expensive lifestyle.

His

deteriorating relations with the General Court had impaired his continued effectiveness.

As a result, the holdover King appointees on the Board of Regents, three of whom were
on the search committee, now wanted someone whom the legislators liked and respected.
In their eyes, James Collins was the ideal person. Endowed with abundant Irish charm and
wit and popular among his peers, he was a seasoned Democratic politician with fourteen
years of legislative experience. Thus, he could serve their interests well in the competition
for state funding.

As

the former chairman of the joint Education Committee, the thirty-

nine-year-old Collins had

ondary school reform.
ated from

won his

reputation in leading the fight for elementary and sec-

A son of a taxi driver, the Hampshire County Democrat had gradu-

UMass/Amherst

in

protege of Regent John Fox,

1968 and from Suffolk

who had close ties

In the view of many observers, Judge

McGee

1984.

He was also the

Fox saw

the chancellorship as a

way of rehabilitat-

had been stripped of his committee chair in a House leadership
1984. Collins had backed incumbent Speaker Thomas McGee in that fight, but
lost to George Keverian, who had promised rules reform in the lower House. No

ing Collins.
fight in

Law School in

with former Speaker David Bartley.

The

latter

one played the inside
tary to former

political

game better than Judge Fox. He had served as

Governor Paul A. Dever from 1949

18

to 1952. In 1972,

chief secre-

he cosponsored the

which served as a national model

handgun control legislation. As a
its Boston campus.
It became clear that a combination of ethnic, class, and Democratic party loyalties were
the main factors that shaped the thinking of the King appointees on the Board of Regents.
The fact that Collins was an alumnus of UMass/Amherst made him all the more attractive
to them. With a home-grown product of the public system right in their midst, they saw
Bartley-Fox

bill,

for

former trustee of UMass, Fox was closely identified with

little

or no need to conduct a national search.

Brimming with confidence,

they gave

some

thought to putting Collins in office without going through the motions of a search, but
16
they decided against such a move.

The

anti-Collins camp,

which was made up

entirely of

Governor Dukakis appointees led
attitudes. They wanted to

by Ylvisaker and Minor, operated with fundamentally divergent
find the best educator in the nation or
lic

someone who knew how

to

manage a complex pub-

organization. If that person happened to be a minority or female, so

much the better.

Affirmative action and the advancement of women's rights were values that they prized.
Clearly they did not want to have another Irishman or a Beacon Hill crony in the post.

While they desired someone who could develop a good rapport with the

legislature, they

did not see this dimension as an absolute prerequisite for the job. If they had to accept a

much preferred state Senator John Olver, who held an earned doctorate in
He had taught for several years at UMass/Amherst. Above all, they
for a tough-minded administrator who had experience in shaping academic

legislator, they

chemistry from MIT.

were looking
was familiar with the way bureaucracy works. Put another way, they wanted a
"change agent" who could shake things up and turn the Board of Regents around in much

policy and

the

same way

that Ira

Jackson had done

at the state

Department of Revenue. Whether they

could find such a person remained to be seen, but they were determined to cast as wide a
net as possible. 17

At a courtesy meeting held on January
tions to the search group.

8,

1986, Governor Dukakis revealed his assump-

He indicated that he wanted a

"cracker-jack" appointment but

was hopeful that they might find a qualified person within the state. In the past, there had
been a large turnover of people who had been recruited from out of state. He also wanted
someone with political savvy who knew Massachusetts and could hit the ground running.
Hassan Minor recalled the governor saying, "I'm not the least bit interested in academic
deans

who can't find their way through the State House." Dukakis
18

expressed his dismay

nobody from Massachusetts had surfaced in the recent search for a new commissioner
for the state Board of Education, which dealt with elementary and secondary schools.
At one point in the meeting, Ylvisaker attempted to flush out the governor by asking
him a loaded question. "We have heard stories to the effect that somebody already has
been picked for the chancellorship. How do you respond?" Dukakis said that he had heard
similar "rumors coming over the transom," but as far as he was concerned there was no
that

inside candidate for the job.

He ended the meeting by telling the committee that he wanted
much as possible.

"to keep politics out of the search" as

Reaction to the meeting varied. The pro-Collins forces interpreted the governor's remarks as a "backhanded endorsement" of their man. The anti-Collins camp felt encouraged by his disclaimer about an inside candidate. Obviously, the governor had given them
mixed signals. Had he defined more clearly the objective or outcome he had in mind,
subsequent events might have been different. They might even have produced a happier
result from his standpoint. Privately, he confided to Beaubien that he could live with
someone who was not a traditional academic. In fact, the governor seriously considered
his close friend and political adviser Edward Lashman as a possible candidate. But

19
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Lashman, who came from the labor movement and lacked even a bachelor's degree, declined to be considered. After discussing the matter with David Bartley,

Lashman con-

cluded that his candidacy not only would be an affront to academic people but would also

damage

the governor politically.

Dukakis did agree

I9

need for a more competitive chancellor's

to the

ised to press for early legislative action.

and he prom-

however. That in

an issue. As James Howell lamented, "The pay raise issue was the albatross

itself became

that

salary,

He did not keep his promise,

hung above our

ship."

20

Even more revealing was

the exchange that took place between the governor and Boston

Globe reporter Steve Curwood. In an exclusive personal interview intended

for publica-

Curwood asked Dukakis about the charges that his administration was not fully supportive of UMass/Amherst as the flagship institution. Dukakis answered, "We aren't
tion,

California, we're not Texas, and we're not Michigan.

pen

to

We're a different

have some of the finest academic institutions in the world.

state.

We do hap-

And I don't think it

makes sense for us to try to duplicate that." 21 Such words inflamed smoldering tensions.
The interview infuriated the constituencies who identified themselves with public higher
education. Many of them feared that the governor lacked sympathy for their cause and was
not genuinely committed to providing educational leaders of superior quality. Besides
leaving himself vulnerable to charges of favoritism, the governor inadvertently undercut
the search. His

comments went a long way

to explaining his failure to play a

more aggres-

sive leadership role, particularly in the early stages of the search.

A short time later, a small group of Regents, which included Beaubien, Fox, Minor,

and

Ylvisaker, paid courtesy calls to both Speaker Keverian and Senate President Bulger.

Among other things,
recruitment of a

new

they discussed the salary issue as a major problem facing
chancellor. Keverian promised that he

efforts to seek corrective legislative action.

would not

them

in the

interfere with their

While Bulger indicated that he did not favor a
up any roadblocks.
soon got bogged down in an intramural spat

salary increase, he likewise promised not to put

The

drafting of the necessary legislation

between James Samels, the attorney for the Board of Regents, and Stephen Rosenfeld, the
governor's legal counsel. Consequently, the pay raise

March 27. The governor's
cellor's salary

by

bill

statute. It

was designed

bill

(H-5474) was not filed

until

to eliminate the practice of setting the chan-

delegated this prerogative to the Regents, subject to the ap-

proval of the commissioner of administration and finance, at that time Frank Keefe.

Public hearing on the

bill

was held by the Public Service Committee on April

16. Since

Ylvisaker was out of town that day, Beaubien and Minor testified at the hearing.

On May 6,
tee,

but

it

the pay raise bill

was reported favorably out of the Public Service Commit-

now appeared in much different form. The new

Regents to

set the salary, but the first increase

had

to

draft (H-5639) allowed the

be approved by the Ways and Means

committees of both houses. The legislative intent was to retain the "power of the purse"

means of exerting leverage on the Board of Regents. H-5639 was then referred to the
House Ways and Means Committee, where it languished and never resurfaced. The bill,
which became an instrument of control for Speaker Keverian, succumbed to a slow and
as a

painful death.

22

The Nature of the

Selection Process

The selection process was essentially a two-stage affair. The first stage, which extended
from January 8 to June 19, involved establishing procedures, organizing the search, and

20

The

two functions were performed by the search commititself. The second stage was shorter but
covered the twelve days between June 20 and July 1 when the Regents

screening the applicants.
tee.

Procedures were

more

intensive.

It

set

latter

by the Board of Regents

,

interviewed the four finalists and then finally picked the chancellor.

During the

were

all

first stage, the

search committee held fifteen meetings. These meetings

duly announced as required by the state open meeting law. Formal minutes were

recorded and made publicly available. Janet Eisner hosted most of the meetings

Dedham and at the Park Plaza Hotel in

at

her

MIT's Endicott House in
Boston. Ylvisaker, who was designated as the

campus. Those involving candidate interviews were held

at

sole

spokesman for the search committee, reported about its progress at each meeting of the
Board of Regents. He delegated the staff work to Hassan Minor, who was director of a
nonprofit community organization headquartered at 315 Commonwealth Avenue in Boston. Candidate files were kept sequestered there during the first stage. The committee
originally contracted with the Association of Governing Boards (AGB) of American Colleges and Universities to conduct reference checks

a scheduling conflict, the

which performed the same

service.

23

Given the divergences between the

would have

difficulty

pect; at least

on semifinalist candidates. Because of

AGB was later replaced by the firm Peter Levine Associates,
rival factions,

working with each

he came to see

it

right away.

it

could have been predicted that they

may have foreseen that prosHe showed a meticulous concern for maintain-

other. Ylvisaker

ing a proper balance between politics and education. To the King appointees, Ylvisaker

seemed more
anism

mechwould be rigged or otherwise sub-

interested in process than in outcome. Unless he developed a fail-safe

for protecting the process,

he was afraid that

it

was heightened by the rumors of a "political fix." He soon
found a way around the dilemma.
The Board of Regents meeting of February 1 1 was held at Roxbury Community College. Because of a winter snowstorm, six Regents were absent, including James Howell
and Kathleen Harrington. At this meeting, Ylvisaker introduced a resolution that committed the Regents to make their appointment from a list of three to five candidates recommended by the search committee. If none of them proved acceptable, Ylvisaker's
verted. Ylvisaker's concern

was to be remanded back to the search comwhich would then provide additional recommendations. This provision was designed to guard against the repetition of the stalemate that had occurred in 1981 It was a

resolution further stipulated that the process
mittee,

.

masterful stroke that was deceptively simple. Since the resolution passed by a vote of 8 to
1

,

the Collins forces either

Gerard Doherty opposed

were caught off guard or were slow on the uptake. Only
24

it.

More lay behind this maneuver than met the eye. The

message it conveyed to the
good faith and therefore
could not be trusted. More significant were the realities that it moved power away from
the Board of Regents and farmed out more of its autonomy. Gerard Doherty, who had
subtle

Collins people was that they themselves were not operating in

missed the December 10 meeting when the Regents had approved the composition of the
search committee, strongly objected to Ylvisaker's resolution on the grounds that
ferred his authority as a Regent to five non-Regents,

who did not share his

responsibility or political accountability. In his view, the Ylvisaker

it

trans-

statutory

maneuver was reminis-

cent of the "politics of exclusion" that had banned certain people from the 1968

Demo-

cratic national convention. 25

In that issue lay the misunderstanding. Ylvisaker,
as "shark repellent," got his

way

who privately referred to his scheme

in the adoption of the binding resolution but stored

21

up
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trouble for himself in
tion.

its

execution, thereby setting the stage for gubernatorial interven-

For the time being, calm nevertheless prevailed.

The search committee had established a set of procedural guidelines that were appended
They also rewrote the chancellor's job description, but not
without some difficulty. Given the wide gaps in perspective, they found it hard to agree on
to Ylvisaker's resolution.

the kind of person

whom they wanted to fill the position.

they finally reached a consensus.
gerial skills required to run a

After extensive deliberation,

Much emphasis was placed on the leadership and mana-

comprehensive system with twenty-nine campuses. Another

criterion called for "sensitivity to the educational needs of a changing population,

and a

record of commitment to affirmative action." 26 Although the job description mentioned

an "earned doctorate" was desired, the wording was ambiguous enough to allow for
someone who lacked such a degree. In fact, the guidelines specifically allowed for "exceptional talent or accomplishment" as a qualification equivalency. They intentionally
steered clear of making the Ph.D. the litmus test. It was preferred but not required.
The Massachusetts chancellor vacancy was advertised in the Chronicle of Higher Education, Black Issues in Higher Education, and Boston and national newspapers, with
that

March

and nominations. In an effort to atwere sent to women's organizations and traditional
black colleges encouraging them to apply. With these tasks completed, the wide net had
15, 1986, set as the deadline for applications

tract

women and minorities,

been

cast.

The next

step

letters

was the screening of candidates. By the March 15 cutoff date, the com-

mittee had received 107 nominations, constituting a rich pool of both national and local

A subcommittee composed of Ylvisaker, Knapp, and Minor did the initial

candidates.

first cuts were relatively easy. By March 31 they had reduced the pool
from 107 to 32. Some 39 either withdrew or failed to complete their applications. Another
36 were eliminated for various reasons. Of the remaining 32 candidates, 6 were people of
color, 16 were white, and race was indeterminable for the remainder. There were 6
women and 26 men. 27

screening.

The

,

Surviving the Next

On April

3, the

Two Cuts

search committee unanimously approved the work of its screening sub-

committee. They spent the next two weeks examining candidate
Rose, the Regents' affirmative action officer, gave the
of approval.
guidelines.

who

28

He found its

racial

On the same day,

survived this cut

list

and gender composition

files.

On April

17,

Bruce

of 32 names his official stamp

to fall within the prescribed

winnowed the field from 32 to 12. Those
were Alice Chandler, James Collins, Robert Corrigan, Elbert
the committee

Leon Ginsberg, Frankly n Jenifer, William Monat, Barbara Newell, John Olver,
Lawrence Pettit, Donald Stewart, and Blenda Wilson. This first short list consisted of 3
women and 9 men, three of whom were black.
The first indication of trouble was the leaking of these names to the press. On learning
of the leak, Ylvisaker became visibly angered by the breach in confidentiality. The main
casualty was Blenda Wilson, a black female educator who headed Colorado's Commission on Higher Education. She immediately dropped out of the competition to protect her
quest for the presidency of Spelman College in Georgia. This post was being vacated by
Donald Stewart, whom she did not want to offend. Up to that point, Wilson, along with
Barbara Newell, were Ylvisaker's favorite contenders. Wilson had previously worked for
Fretwell,
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him

as an assistant

camp was

dean

at

Harvard.

It

was generally conceded

To no one's surprise, two

state legislators

stereotype of Collins as a "hack politician"

His

someone

in the Collins

survived this cut. Most participants

Collins and Olver were being paired to offset each other.

fied.

that

responsible for the news leak.

critics

who

felt that

The Ylvisaker group clung

to a

they believed was only marginally quali-

considered him an opportunist. They deplored the fact that he lacked a

doctorate degree and that he did not

come from

a traditional academic background.

Add-

ing insult to injury, they admitted that Collins had been absorbed in elementary and sec-

ondary education, but they argued

that

he was a "Johnny-come-lately" with regard to

higher education. Another complaint of his chief detractors was that Collins had never

The only job that the legislator held prior to
Upward Bound program at UMass/Amherst.
For that matter, state Senator John Olver suffered from the same deficiency. He too had
not managed a large public organization. Perhaps that was inevitable. It speaks to the

managed

a large-scale public organization.

entering politics was assistant director of an

legislative careers

Both chaired

and the overlapping

legislative

interests that the

two prominent

men

shared.

committees, both were politically qualified, and both came

from Amherst.
The Collins advocates rebutted their opponents by arguing that their candidate more
than met the "qualification equivalency" as specified in the accepted procedural guidelines through his legislative accomplishments. They were quick to point out that even the
president of Harvard University only had a law degree and not an earned doctorate. They
saw an attack on Collins as an attack on

legislators in general. Senate President

Bulger stayed out of the chancellor search controversy largely in deference to
tor

John Olver. Although Bulger liked Collins personally, he did not want

colleague Olver by going against

him publicly.

It

to

William

state

Sena-

embarrass his

was a form of senatorial courtesy on

Bulger's part.

While

this furor

continued within the Board of Regents, House Speaker Keverian

threatening gestures of blocking the chancellor's pay raise

among the

finalists.

bill

made

unless Collins appeared

That pressure grew in intensity as the "ownership mentality" of the

General Court asserted

itself.

In legislative circles, Keverian's support of Collins

was

seen as a symbolic act intended to show that the Speaker was not vindictive toward his
previous opponents in the 1984 House fight as long as they accepted his leadership.

Further complications arose

when

selection of the chancellor

Gender and race were affirmative action criteria
The same was true of other factors such as social class,
lines.

tion of these variables

Inherited

made the

that

age,

had
and

search committee's choices that

memories of the past gave

was attempted across sex
to

be taken into account.

Any combinamuch more difficult.
ethnicity.

certain options added weight and at the

same time

tended to exclude others.
In early May, as the emerging controversy surfaced publicly, the search committee

began

its first

prepared a

list

round of interviews. Professor Robert Lee from Fitchburg State College
of questions that solicited pertinent information about each candidate's

track record and about his or her

Due to

commitment to

salient issues in public higher education.

scheduling problems, these interviews progressed slowly. Ylvisaker notified the

Board of Regents that the search committee would not be able to present its final slate of
candidates by the Board's June 9 meeting as originally planned. He also informed Beaubien that the search was becoming politicized. The Collins entourage was especially active in May. Judge Fox lobbied hard to line up the necessary votes for his protege. The
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appeared heavy-handed to those

tactics of the Collins forces

who were not enamored

of Collins.

Beaubien,

who

readily admitted that his business interests

chairman of the Board of Regents, was content

as

refrained from taking sides.

Martin, the Board's

Compared with

were interfering with

to play a passive role.

his job

studiously

the forceful leadership exercised by

James R.

He did not have the

chairman, Beaubien seemed weak and inept.

first

He

organizational skills to prevent the drift that the agency was experiencing. Without a firm

hand

at the

helm, coupled with the custodial chancellorship of Joseph Finnegan, the

Board of Regents was

On May

left

operating with a loose rudder.
to six was made. By this time,
They included Blenda Wilson of Colorado, Alice
and William Monat, chancellor of the Illinois Board of

22, the penultimate cut

from twelve candidates

three of the contenders had dropped out.

Chandler of SUN Y
Regents,

who

at

New

Paltz,

accepted a job elsewhere. That

left

nine remaining.

Of these, Robert Corri-

gan of UMass/Boston, Leon Ginsberg of West Virginia, and Lawrence
versity

Pettit of the UniSystem of South Texas were eliminated. Corrigan was seen by the Collins backers

Boston University and the resurgence of UMass/Amherst. They
was inappropriate for him to move ahead of his boss, David Knapp. At the

as a threat to both

thought

it

conclusion of the meeting to narrow the field, the committee sensed a

move

afoot by

Ylvisaker and Minor to limit the number of finalists to four. 29

Selection of the Final

As

the search entered

Four
its

final stages in June, the Collins

phalanx became alarmed, and

with good reason. Since their native son candidate had barely edged out Leon Ginsberg
for the sixth spot, they feared that

now attempted

he might be eliminated

in the final cut.

To avoid such a

do what they had flirted with back in December. At
the Board of Regents meeting of June 9, which met in executive session, the Collins backconsequence, they

to

way to put their man in office.
move and warned that if the search were disrupted he would
be forced to go public. His counterthreat worked. The Collins faction backed off and
withdrew their motion. As a compromise, the Board of Regents took the easy way out and
ers

moved to dispense with

the search and thereby clear the

Ylvisaker firmly resisted this

authorized the submission of six names as finalists.
that the search

committee would take

For a meeting

that

was called

this

for the

way

out.

And indeed,

for a time

it

appeared

30

purpose of reducing internal

strife, it

did not suc-

ceed. Strong differences of opinion split the Board of Regents. At one point, Janet Eisner

walked out of the meeting

in

complete disgust, but Elizabeth Rawlins talked her into com-

ing back. Eisner deplored the fact that the Board had spent five hours discussing the
search,

compared with one hour discussing

the crisis at Westfield State College.

Only

fragmentary accounts of their confidential discussions leaked out, some of them a year

The discordant factions now went their separate ways as the donnybrook headed for
major showdown.
Three days later, on June 12, Eisner notified her fellow Regents that since she would be
leaving the country for the next few weeks she would not be participating in their upcoming decisions. This announcement came as a big blow to the Collins camp, which had

later.

its first

vote. Some thought that she "took a walk" to avoid trustee
Emmanuel is a Catholic women's college that was founded by
As might be expected, many of its alumnae favored Collins. How much

been counting heavily on her
pressure on her campus.
the Irish in 1919.

24

pressure they actually applied to their trustees and president cannot be ascertained. Eisner
herself unequivocally denied such allegations, claiming that she had scheduled her trip

months

For

in advance.

tely preferred E.

Maneuvers on both

candidacy presented a quality issue. She defini-

her, the Collins

who

K. Fretwell,

she

felt

would bring

stature to the

commonwealth. 31

sides heightened the impression of a political fix. Distracting

bombshells, like the Westfield State scandal and the conflict-of-interest charges leveled
against Regent

James Howell, exploded

The mudslinging continued un-

in their midst.

abated. Collins was severely criticized for his opposition to the creation of the Board of

Regents and his subsequent attempts to repeal the enabling legislation.

and ludicrous

he would now be chosen

to his detractors that

to

It

seemed absurd
that he had

head the agency

previously tried to dismantle. In a similar vein, John Olver was taken to task for his stance
in favor of abolishing the president's office at

plained bitterly that the
lor.

UMass. The pro-Collins Regents com-

non-Regents were usurping their prerogative to select the chancel-

Failure by chairman Beaubien to clarify this confusion in roles not only exacerbated

the process issue but also led to a temporary breakdown in accountability.

On June

12 and 18, the six semifinalists were invited back for a second interview with

nonsearch Regents in attendance. Complete reference checks were made on each candidate.

At the beginning of the search, Collins had asked several well-known educators

to

nominate and endorse him. Gregory Anrig, the president of Educational Testing Service

and former

state secretary for education,

also obtained

nominated him

for the chancellorship. Collins

recommendations from the renowned historian Henry Steele Commager

and from Peter Pouncey, the president of Amherst College. In addition

to these,

he re-

ceived endorsements from a legislative delegation composed of UMass alumni and from
the Massachusetts Black Legislative Caucus. 32

The

latter

endorsement was considered

to

be a real coup for affirmative action. But the outside consulting firm (AGB) downplayed
the impact of these endorsements.

The

mendation were unreliable because

consultants indicated that such letters of recom-

their authors could

be sued in a court of law

if

they

wrote comments that might be construed as damaging.

What particularly

irked the Collins

to see these letters or to attend the

Hassan Minor kept the

letters

camp

is

that the

nonsearch Regents were not allowed

meetings of the search committee. As staff director,

under

tight security in his private office. This

distorted the process by giving the anti-Collins group an unfair advantage.
ell

put

Minor

it:

"He who

controls the mail has the power." 33

for other reasons.

They

felt that

The

Collins faction was peeved at

he had his own agenda, which was to get Franklyn

Jenifer elected chancellor. Minor's close friendship with journalist Steve

were highly

critical

of Collins and his

information to the press. But not
In 1987, a year

later,

all

Curwood of the

was no accident that Curwood' s artisupporters. Both sides were guilty of leaking

Boston Globe also disturbed them. In their view,
cles

procedure

As James How-

it

of the leaks were detectable, at least not immediately.

the Boston Globe revealed that John Sasso, the governor's top aide,

had leaked damaging information about Collins 's academic record in law school. 34
Amid the swirl of conflicting information, UMass president David Knapp played a

He was largely responsible for getting him into the
Knapp warned his cohorts that there would be a major uproar if they
excluded Collins. 35 Some saw Knapp acting in his own self-interest in not wanting a strong
chancellor who might well overshadow him. Others believed that if Collins became chancellor, he would have to depend on Knapp for advice and counsel. Still others felt that
Knapp was under heavy pressure from both the UMass Alumni Association and the public
crucial role in promoting Collins.

semifinal round.
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fall in line behind Collins. Knapp's motives may have been
mixed but surely were more complex than his critics would acknowledge.
During the second round of interviews, Donald Stewart, the president of Spelman Col-

college presidents' group to

lege in Georgia, impressed everyone, but he suffered

and Collins

in not

from the same drawback

as Olver

having managed a large public organization. Barbara Newell came

across as an upper-middle-class professional

woman who knew

earlier days as president of Wellesley College. Since then, she

Massachusetts from her

had been chancellor of the

Board of Regents in Florida, where she ran into difficulty with its state legislature. In
1986, she was a visiting scholar at Harvard, and over the years she had been friendly with
Ylvisaker. The Collins faction found Newell not only aloof but also unsympathetic to their
concerns. Frankly n Jenifer, who felt that a few questions in his first interview were "flagrantly racist," fared somewhat better in his second interview. 36 He was able to use his
central office experience in New Jersey to advantage. The chancellor position was a career advancement for him, since he would be moving up from a deputy position to the top
spot. E. K. Fretwell, who had done his graduate work at Harvard, came right out of central casting. He was an orthodox candidate typically revered in the halls of academe. In
this sense, he had a perfect resume. At sixty-two years of age, the chancellor of the University of North Carolina at Charlotte had spent a lifetime in education and had gained a
stellar reputation nationally. Fretwell, however, was seen as nearing retirement. Neverthe37
less, the age factor did not seem to harm his chances. He was on everybody's short list.
Salary remained the big stumbling block. Paradoxically, Massachusetts had one of the
largest systems with one of the lowest salaries. Speaker Keverian was now holding the pay
raise bill hostage as a means of promoting Collins. Of the six semifinalists, only Olver
and Collins were willing to accept the job at the current salary of $65,000. There was also
a housing allowance of $18,000. This combined figure paled by comparison to the
$178,000 that California paid the head of its system. The other four candidates felt the
total

compensation package was too low, though Newell and Jenifer were willing to negoFretwell and Stewart were not. Stewart was astounded to learn that the Massachu-

tiate.

setts

chancellor earned less than

some of the public

college presidents within the

same

system. Frustrated in their attempts to change the law, the Regents were powerless to
rectify the situation.

Keverian 's tactics had stymied the search committee. Caught in a

classic catch-22, Ylvisaker

found himself with

little

room to maneuver. His

antagonists

gave him no end of trouble.

The
June

final

19.

meeting of the search committee was held

at the

Park Plaza Hotel

in

Boston on

Before commencing, they waited over an hour for the arrival of the student

ber, Eileen Parise,

who was

stuck in a traffic jam on the Southeast Expressway.

As

mem-

a

became that much more crucial. Both
young and inexperienced, Parise was pliable.
Intent on circumventing the Regents' June 9 directive, Hassan Minor presented a threestep process. One was to reject the Regents' directive that authorized six candidates. A
second was to submit only four names. The third was to select the four people and submit
them in unranked order. All three steps were discussed at length and approved. The
result of the absence of Janet Eisner, Parise's vote

sides insisted

on waiting.

results of the tally

on the

Still

third option put Fretwell

on top with a

maximum often votes,

followed by Olver with nine, Jenifer with eight, and Newell with
short

list

The

were Collins with four votes and Stewart with

Collins group reacted in shock to the outcome.

three.

six.

Eliminated from the

38

They were particularly disap-

pointed in Eileen Parise. She was the one vote they had miscalculated.
son,

who was pushing Barbara Newell,

felt that

26

Mary Lou Ander-

the Collins people had exhibited "sexist"

behavior in their questioning of Newell. Anderson was accused by them of exerting undue
influence on Parise in persuading her not to vote for Collins. Both Anderson and Parise

denied that any sort of arm-twisting had taken place. 39 But the Collins backers claimed to
have overheard conversations to the contrary. In any case, they were furious. Suspecting
that Ylvisaker

had engineered the outcome, they accused him of having rigged the process
from making the list of four finalists. There was an element of truth in

to prevent Collins

their accusations

a

when one considers

that Ylvisaker' s

own binding

resolution allowed for

maximum of five candidates. Whatever the grievance, Edward Sullivan

the meeting taking a binder of confidential material that
tered.

The

hostility of Sullivan

was supposed

to

stormed out of

remain seques-

toward Ylvisaker and Minor became especially caustic.

Shortly afterward, Collins had an unexpected meeting with former state representative

Mel King.

Collins told the black leader that he was disappointed in King's wife, Joyce,

who did not vote

for him.

She favored Jenifer and Stewart, whom she saw as risk takers.
meet the quality standard. Because of her involvement in

In her view, Collins did not

her husband's Boston mayoral campaign, which witnessed the emergence of the "rain-

bow

coalition," the

Roxbury Community College

trustee

had missed several search

committee meetings. 40

Collins Appointed

and Ylvisaker Resigns

Through the remainder of June,
sense of urgency in the Collins

the political pressures and

camp bordered on

maneuvering

intensified.

frenzy. Panic seized the

members

The

as

they realized that the terms of three Regents (Eisner, Howell, and Paresky) were about to
expire.

They were

afraid of losing their numerical advantage

pressed for a final decision by July

1

.

on the Board. So they
the major uproar now

As David Knapp had warned,

erupted. Still smarting from their defeat on June 19, the Collins aggregation not only got
mad, but, in the Irish vernacular, they also got even.
While this fighting was going on, Ylvisaker convinced Dukakis that he was getting
battered by his adversaries. They clobbered him by belaboring the point that his committee

had come up with only one viable candidate, John Olver, who would accept the job at
The governor was reluctant to intervene. He did not want to pull a

the prescribed salary.

power play. In the words of one
because he

is

above

all

critic,

"Dukakis does not thrive

in

such circumstances,

41
a consensus politician uncomfortable with open conflict."

The

governor admitted that he did not have the votes to prevent Collins from being elected
chancellor.

members

He therefore asked Ylvisaker to play the "heavy"

to the

Board of Regents. By

until

he could appoint new

that time, however, Ylvisaker

was perceived by the

opposition as a "tool of the Duke." This perception was based in part on a personal affinity that

had evolved between the two men beginning

a student of Ylvisaker at

Swarthmore College

in the

mid-1950s, when Dukakis was

in Pennsylvania,

and continuing when

their

paths crossed again at Harvard in the late 1970s.

At the Board's special meeting of July 1 in which the full panoply of tensions erupted,
chairman Beaubien had one purpose in mind: to elect a chancellor. After Ylvisaker gave a
brief summary of the search, the first ballot was taken. Jenifer obtained five votes, Olver
,

one, and Fretwell one. Strangely, Newell received none. At the time, both Newell and

Fretwell were traveling as part of an exchange
their

program

in China,

and most Regents read

absence as a sign that they were no longer interested in the position. The Collins

faction showed its strategy by registering eight abstentions. Then came the second ballot.
There were six votes for Jenifer, three for Olver, and six abstentions. The third ballot
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produced the

identical result. Thus, the stalemate that Ylvisaker

had anticipated did

in

fact occur.

At
not,

this juncture, the

and

process should have reverted to the search committee, but

that is precisely

maneuvers designed

where the

flaw

fatal

to scuttle the search,

came

it

did

into play. In a series of parliamentary

George Ellison moved to discharge the search

committee, to rescind the resolution of February 11, and to take nominations from the
floor. All three

motions passed and thereby cleared the way for Collins to reenter the

picture. This pressure caused

Beaubien

When the votes were counted,

Then came

to cave in.

the final ballot.

Collins received eight, Jenifer three, and Olver three.

David Paresky of Weston abstained. As a fellow UMass/Amherst alumnus, Beaubien cast
the decisive vote for Collins.

dent Regent

who

It

was shades of Winthrop Dakin. Norma Markey, the

attended North Shore

Community

stu-

College, also voted for Collins. 42

Ylvisaker was outraged. The implications for the commonwealth seemed alarming to

him.

He believed that the integrity

of the process had been grossly violated.

He resigned

same day, charging that the selection of Collins had been "politically wired" and that
amounted to "politics as usual." 43 Soon after, Eisner, who had returned from abroad,

that
it

tendered her resignation. She wrote a

letter to the

governor that reinforced Ylvisaker'

argument. 44 As a matter of principle, Ylvisaker rejected the governor's offer to place him

back on the Board of Regents.

Gubernatorial Intervention

As much

as any politician in the country, Dukakis,

who had regained the governorship

with an exciting comeback victory in 1982, understood the essence of the political game.

His battle in 1983 to remove a "midnight" appointee of outgoing Governor King as director of the Massachusetts Port Authority

was a perfect

illustration.

Some people saw

close parallel in the chancellor case. Initially, Dukakis took a cautious wait-and-see
tude.

He was

a
atti-

not particularly worried about Collins because he believed that Ylvisaker

would come up with a host of first-rate candidates who would eclipse him. He saw Collins
as a political candidate rather than a substantive one.

On another front,

the governor never delivered

on

his

promise

to obtain legislation

boosting the chancellor's salary. Publicly, he favored the pay increase, but privately he

complained
Dukakis,

Beaubien

to

who

that

he did not earn the kind of money that they had

in

mind.

carried the liabilities as well as the assets of a long political career, was

unable to deliver because of his

rift

with Keverian. This broken promise hurt him with his

own Regent appointees.
But the

was more complicated. Gerard Indelicato, the governor's
on education, did not apprise his boss of what was happening. Nor did he

political intrigue

special assistant

inform the Regents of how Dukakis might react

if Collins were elected. This failure of
communication caused surprise on both sides. Since Indelicato aspired to become president of Bridgewater State College, he was apparently operating in his own self-interest.

He told the
fore,

By

Collins forces that the governor had no problem with their candidate. There-

Kathleen Harrington of Fall River, a Dukakis appointee,

all

felt

free to support Collins.

accounts, Indelicato took advantage of the political bargaining that was going on

and parlayed

it

to get the

Bridgewater presidency. His actions wreaked havoc and caused

major misunderstandings among

all

parties at interest.

According

to

Lashman, Indelicato
him but

did a double disservice to the governor not only by withholding information from
also by not protecting his relationship with Speaker Keverian. 45
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.

When Harrington talked with the governor's
still

did not have his

down

to

aides

own candidate. Furthermore,

on June 30, she learned

she was told that

if

that

Dukakis

the choice boiled

Olver and Jenifer, he would go with Olver. 46 Actually, the governor would have

accepted Olver, but the state senator was not his

first choice.

He leaned more

toward

James Martin of North Carolina, who
sure what might have resulted had Duka-

Fretwell. Dukakis had talked with former governor

spoke highly of Fretwell. 47
kis

No one can know

for

gone with Olver. In hindsight, however, almost everyone

his final acceptance of Jenifer to

The
most

have been wiser and more

political significance of that

politicians

who move into

in his administration believed

fruitful.

acceptance transcended the immediate issue. Like

the front ranks, the governor realized that the political

system within which he had to operate was not only shaping his decisions but also formulating his options. Standing for reelection in the fall,

he could

ill

afford to do nothing,

embarrassment caused by the Westfield State sex scandal.
episode was the catalyst that spurred him to action. Facing criti-

especially with the persistent

Some thought that this

cism for his indecision, Dukakis decided that the

political imperative of defeating Collins

outweighed the moral one of cleaning up the mess
Sasso, put

it,

"This

is

at Westfield.

As

his top aide,

John

about winning."

Echoing similar sentiments was David Nyhan of the Boston Globe, who declared,
"Governors running for reelection, and maybe for president, cannot afford

to get their tail

on something as visible as Collins and his legislative backers made
48
this." The Globe, which had begun as a neutral observer, now found itself as an active
participant attempting to influence the outcome with its blistering editorials and its invesso publicly kicked

tigative journalism.

Except for television station

WGBH,

the weekly newspaper Boston

Phoenix, and the communications media in western Massachusetts, which sided with
Collins, press coverage tended to

be biased

in favor of Dukakis. This

was especially true

of the Globe, whose editorial writers and political cartoonists had a field day in attacking

The major metropolitan daily, which was the newspaper of record, did
detract from the presidential aspirations of Dukakis

the Collins forces.

not want to

The key

With this in mind, the governor interAngered by the unfolding events, he chastised the Board of
Regents for what it had done, replaced its chairman, David Beaubien, with Edwad
Lashman, and announced his intention to have its election of Collins overturned. Part of
his anger was due to the violation of process and part of it stemmed from his being taken
by surprise. He wanted to challenge the election of Collins in court, but Lashman talked
him out of doing so, because Lashman felt that it was clear from reading the statute that
Collins had been elected legally. Whenever Dukakis spoke, he emphasized his personal
commitment to restoring public confidence in a badly shaken system. Wrapped up in
those claims were implicit values of competence, integrity, and good government. 49
It was vintage Dukakis. In his second term he had received a great deal more from the
legislature than he did during his first term. Few governors had done better. But he had to
pay a heavy price for his intervention. It put him on a collision course with the legislature
in general and with the Speaker in particular. After all, Keverian had helped him produce
many striking public policy changes in his second term. Their relationship was now seriously ruptured, if not irreparably harmed. The Speaker had been deeply hurt by being
tarred in the media as a "shabby" Massachusetts politician. The improper fundraising
charges that were leveled against Duff, followed by an investigation ordered by the governor, were the precipitating events that now made it difficult for Dukakis and Keverian to
work out an accommodation. John Sasso was furious at Indelicato for not protecting the
vened

to leadership is seizing the initiative.

in the dispute

on July

2.
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relationship between the governor and the Speaker. Furthermore, Keverian
to the unfavorable

was

sensitive

comments about presumed "patronage."

Stung by the rejection of one of their own, legislators in both

political parties rallied

behind Collins. They bitterly resented his being labeled as a "hack politician."

Many

of

them, including the new House education chairman Nicholas Paleologos, took the insult

They felt it demeaned the entire legislature. To show their support, the DemoHouse unanimously passed a resolution endorsing Collins as chancellor.
There were no dissenting voices. Even the Republicans joined in the heavenly chorus.
What surprised most political pundits is that Collins had been a longtime supporter of
Dukakis. He had remained loyal to him even after Dukakis had lost his primary battle
against Edward King in 1978, when most mainstream Irish Democratic politicians threw
their support behind King. The same was true in the much-publicized rematch of 1982.
personally.

crat-controlled

Two years

later,

Dukakis had a serious

falling out with Collins over their

disagreement

about education reform efforts in 1984 and 1985. In 1984, Collins insisted on pushing a
costly bill mandating large increases in teacher salaries, despite the governor's concern
that the bill

would necessitate a tax increase. This put the governor in the awkward posiHouse leadership bill that had the strong backing of the Massa-

tion of failing to support a

chusetts Teachers Association.

Convinced

that his party leader

governor over
sistent.

Such

was "hoodwinking" the public, Collins broke with the
shrill and per-

His criticism of the Dukakis administration was

this issue.

strident rhetoric planted the seeds of discord.

From then on,

the governor

no

longer considered Collins to be a "team player." 50 Reporter Scot Lehigh, writing for the

Boston Phoenix, correctly attributed
"Clearly,

or philosophy
blunt,
lor."

this

break in relations

from the viewpoint of a governor with no

to their current difficulties:

real higher-education goals, agenda,

— outside of a desire not to be embarrassed — Collins

's

tendency to be

uncompromising, and outspoken made him an uncomfortable choice

for chancel-

51

On July

3,

Dukakis telephoned Collins

The chief executive advised

to see if they

Collins not to resign his

could resolve their differences.

House

seat

and

to stop holding press

He also warned Collins not to go down the path on which he was headed
because he was the only person who would get hurt. Spurning this advice, Collins promptconferences.

from the legislature and decided to stay the course. Forewarned, he figured,
was forearmed. But the crisis had not been resolved
only postponed.
ly resigned

—

Three days

later,

on July

6, reporter

that identified Collins as the

person

Bruce Mohl of the Boston Globe broke the story

who had asked former chancellor Duff to peddle the

tickets for Keverian' s fundraiser. Collins frankly

acknowledged the truth of the story but

claimed that the tickets were intended for Duff's personal use. Contacted by the same
reporter, Duff,

who had taken a job

as

commissioner of the Chicago Public Library, de-

nied such intent. 52

On July

10, Collins

went public with

sion. Citing relevant statistics,

his fight

by making a brief appearance on

televi-

he deplored the fact that one out of four public school

students in Massachusetts dropped out of education.

He pointed out that only

18 percent

of the graduates of Chelsea High School advanced to college while over 85 percent of
those in Amherst did.

perceived

liabilities

By

and

hoped to overcome his
Horace Mann had done in the late

skillfully publicizing the issue, Collins

to

win grass-roots support

as

1830s. Wrapping himself in the mantle of the legendary
crisis, the

Mann, who had faced

a similar

ex- Amherst legislator made his case. In so doing, he continued to stress ele-

mentary and secondary education, thereby lending credence

30

to those

who

attacked

him

for not having a grasp of the issues facing higher education.

which was paid

for

by the

UMass Alumni

But the television broadcast,

Association, did not generate the grounds well

of favorable public opinion that he had anticipated. 53 Even worse,
nor,

who

felt that

Collins had gone too

far.

The

conflict

it

infuriated the gover-

was now reduced

to strictly politi-

cal hardball.

Edward Lashman played his role to
of
Regents
chairman
The
new
Board
was
superb at delay. In a flurry of hastily
perfection.
held
the
Harvard
Club
in
downtown
meetings
at
Boston, he negotiated with
arranged
Collins and offered him a short-term contract, no longer than ninety days. This offer was

As

the governor's hand-picked troubleshooter,

promptly rejected. Collins insisted on a one-year performance contract, but he did not get
it.

His requests to continue negotiations were refused. At

attorney for Collins, threatened to file

he contended was not bargaining

in

good

faith.

Michael West, an

suit against

Lashman, who

Pressure was also put on him to the effect

that if he did not cooperate, the presidential plans of

Lashman remained

this point,

an unfair labor practice

Dukakis would be sabotaged. Un-

He indicated that he was

going to Maine on vacaLashman bought the governor the
time he needed to reshape the Board of Regents with his new appointees.
Frustrated by Lashman 's delay tactics, the Collins group on July 18 attempted to call a
special meeting of the Board of Regents to award their man a long-term contract. Lashman
denied their request. An embittered Edward Sullivan broke with his cohorts on this issue.
He wanted to hold the meeting without Lashman and let Lashman take them to court. But
cooler heads prevailed. The Collins people did not go the litigation route themselves,
daunted,

tion for the last

because

it

steadfast.

two weeks of July. By leaving the

was doubtful

if

state,

they could have obtained injunctive relief. To do so they would

have had to prevail on the merits and to prove instant damage. So they dropped the idea of
a legal challenge. To save face, they sent Harrington as an emissary to John Sasso to find

out

if

they could reach a compromise. She never heard back from him.

ball to the end.

It

would be hard-
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Frantic to stave off the removal of Collins,

on July 24 seven of his supporters asked

Attorney General Francis X. Bellotti to rule on the legality of the matter. Responding the
very next day, Bellotti gave them both good news and bad news. The good news was that

on July 1 The bad news was that the chancelBoard of Regents and is "subject to removal by the board

Collins had been legally elected chancellor
lor serves at the pleasure of the

.

with no legal entitlement to serve out any contractually specified term." 55

On this pro-

was sealed for all practical purposes. Although his days
were numbered, the outcome was by no means a foregone conclusion.
Almost simultaneously, television station WBZ in Boston announced the results of a

phetic note, the fate of Collins

public opinion poll that
tract,

it

had commissioned.

When asked if Collins should receive a con-

27 percent of those polled responded affirmatively; when asked

be reopened, 39 percent agreed; and 33 percent said they didn't know.

if

the search should

When asked whether

Dukakis's actions were politically motivated or whether he was acting to preserve the
legitimacy of the search process, 33 percent responded affirmatively to the first question;

27 percent agreed with the second; and 39 percent fell into the "don't know" category. 56

Collins

Removed and Jenifer Appointed

who had dug in his heels,
campus in an effort to stabilize the unrest there. He also asked
Ethics Commission if it would be proper for him to hire his former legislative

Through July and August

the pressure did not subside. Collins,

visited the Westfield State

the state
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aide,

who was

a

nephew of Regent John Fox. To top

it

off, Collins

announced plans

for the

establishment of a public-private partnership for the purpose of helping disadvantaged

youth go on to college. These moves were more symbolic than substantive. Most knowledgeable observers interpreted his actions as a concerted public relations effort to rescue

an embattled chancellorship.

On July

31

,

Dukakis appointed three new Regents.

He

chose Ellen Guiney, director of

Boston's city wide educational coalition; Paul Doherty, a Springfield attorney; and Joe

Henson, president of Prime Computer. These appointments made

political sense, but the

academic community was not impressed. While the governor did not exact a pledge from
his appointees to vote against Collins, he did ask them for a commitment to vote on procedural matters and to reopen the search. Speaker Keverian accused the governor of "pack-

new members
Lashman now granted the Collins faction its request for a special meeting. It was
held on August 5. By identical votes of 9 to 7, the Board of Regents reinstituted the search
and denied Collins the one-year performance contract that he was seeking. 57 The balance
ing the board" to ensure that Collins would be removed. With the three

aboard,

of power had clearly shifted in the governor's favor.

Because they already had a

list

of credible candidates, the Board of Regents agreed

informally not to expand the reopened search. Instead of starting from scratch, they

merely picked up where they had

left

off in late June. This time, however, only the Re-

gents participated, thus restoring their lost autonomy.

persuading the former
Newell,

who dropped out of contention on August

ment had become too

politicized.

Lashman had

18 because she

him

Since Collins was
less,

Lashman

a

still

commitment

in writing that they

legally the chancellor,

insisted that

convince Barbara

felt that

the environ-

To avoid the potential embarrassment of a candidate's

refusing to accept the position because of the low salary,

candidates give

a difficult task in

He did not try to

finalists to return to the race.

Lashman insisted that all the

would accept the job

if

offered

it.

he presented a special problem. Neverthe-

he declare his intentions in writing

if

he wished

to

be consid-

ered. Collins grudgingly complied with the request.

At about the same time, the press announced
president of the College Board in
criticize the
cally,

that

New York City.

Donald Stewart had been hired

as

This prompted the Boston Globe to

Dukakis administration for allowing Stewart

to slip

through

its

net.
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Ironi-

Gregory Anrig, who had nominated Collins, was the head of the parent organiza-

tion that hired Stewart.

Anrig was effusive

in his praise of Stewart.

The

ultimate irony, of

course, was that Franklyn Jenifer happened to be a prominent Catholic layman. But nei-

community nor the black community rallied to his support. 59
During the month of August, the Regents interviewed the four candidates once again. It
was clear to them that if either Collins or Olver were chosen, the system would become
captive of the legislature. If Fretwell were picked, they would be getting a custodial chancellor who was approaching the end of his career. Fretwell 's performance in this interview was disappointing. By contrast, Jenifer was most impressive. He offered something
different both in style and in substance. The former high school dropout and Rutgers
biology professor made it clear that his loyalty would be primarily to the people of the
commonwealth rather than to the General Court. He came across as a mover, shaker, and
policymaker who intended to stir things up and to plan on a systemwide basis.
But the fight was not over yet. A campaign appears to have been undertaken to discredit
Jenifer and to scare him off. A number of New Jersey Democrats, including members of
the state legislature, advised Jenifer to drop out of the race. He was also informed that he
would never get a pay raise if he accepted the Massachusetts post. Even worse, rumors
ther the Catholic

32

were spread

that Jenifer

had been involved

in a sexual

harassment case

Lashman launched an immediate

in

New Jersey. On

Massachuhe also had Jenifer checked out independently by a private detective agency. The results of both investigations cleared Jenifer completely of the
learning of this gossip,

Playing

setts state police.

investigation by the

safe,

it

attempted character assassination. 60
In the meantime, the governor

met with both Fretwell and Jenifer

After talking with them, Dukakis

still

Lashman' s home.

at

entertained a preference for Fretwell. In the gover-

nor's mind, Fretwell was the safer candidate because he was better

known and he

fit all

the parameters. Dukakis remained unconvinced about Jenifer's suitability. Quite apart

from the smear campaign that was rearing its ugly head, the governor had some reservaAs September approached, support for Jenifer coalesced. Henson flew to

tions about him.

New Jersey to check him out,

while Nicholas Boraski spoke with his contacts there at

General Electric. In the end, Jenifer was Lashman 's candidate.

The

stage

was

another showdown. Appointment and removal were the two

set for yet

items on the agenda at the Regents' September 9 meeting.

was

futile,

fare, the

Sullivan did not even bother to

show up

Board of Regents elected Franklyn Jenifer as

votes to Collins 's 6. Strange as

force the Regents to dismiss

it

may seem,

him face to

Knowing

for this meeting.
its

new

that the Collins cause

Without much fan-

chancellor.

He obtained 9
He wanted to

Collins insisted on being fired.

face.

Complying with

his wishes, the Regents

terminated him as chancellor effective September 12. This ended the protracted and hardfought battle that

left its

weary combatants

either traumatized or elated.
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Lessons Learned

Looking back over these events and analyzing
case history

is

important. In

their implications,

more ways than one,

lor illuminates the course not to take.

one has

to ask

why

this

the search for a Massachusetts chancel-

There can be

little

doubt that the

initial

outcome had

been the result of faulty decisions or decision-making processes. Putting aside the clash of

which cannot be minimized, the major difficulties were systemic as well as
the political domain has an ownership stake in the Board of
Regents, and that in itself flaws the process. Appointments to the Board of Regents are
made primarily from the private sector. This is a structural problem that has since been

personalities,

More to the point,

procedural.

rectified to
cials

some

extent with the clarification in the state ethics law. Private college offi-

should not be in the business of regulating their public sector counterparts. In addi-

tion to the glaring conflict of interest involved,

it

also contravenes the

Board of Regents'

oversight function with regard to private institutions.

By

allowing five outsiders to participate in their search, the Regents unwittingly gave up

make

a certain degree of autonomy at the outset. Ostensibly, this action was taken to

process
political

more democratic, but it resulted
manipulation that

it

in

making the Board of Regents susceptible

could not withstand in

especially fragile during this nurturing stage. To

resolution gave away

its

bureaucratic infancy.

compound the

more of this perishable commodity.

the
to

Autonomy

difficulty, the

is

Ylvisaker

In the future, the Regents will

have to proceed more cautiously before dispensing with any of their autonomy.
This issue naturally leads to the question of predetermination. To what extent was the

candidacy of James Collins
that the "fix
less,

doomed at the beginning,

was in"? Answers

to this question

given the widespread perception

remain uncertain and partisan. Nonethe-

considering the climate that existed in Massachusetts in 1986, the Collins candidacy

seemed almost destined

to fail. Public opinion polls reflected the strains of the dispute.
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Collins probably suffered

from not having the

right

more from being stereotyped

lay a virulent antilegislative bias.

esteem by the

citizenry.

a "hack politician" than he did

academic credentials. Embedded

But

at

shopworn stereotype
in high

provides only a partial explanation. The Hampshire

this bias

County Democrat personified

in that

At the time, the General Court was not held

once the

vates, the rebirth of UMass/Amherst,

Irish establishment, the publics versus the pri-

and the cultural values of rural, small-town western

Massachusetts, where he was perceived as a popular folk hero

who was

standing up to the

pressure of the powerful elites in Boston. The urban-rural rivalries, in their subtle varia-

worked

tions,
It is

to Collins 's detriment.
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also revealing to note that the triumvirate of Ylvisaker,

Lashman, and Dukakis

all

came from Harvard, an institution steeped in tradition and seen as the bastion of elitism.
In terms of the new politics, they were a throwback to the old Yankees, who had fought
and excluded the

Irish in

an earlier era. Both Doherty and Keverian were graduates of

Harvard, but they had come from working-class origins. To be sure, their close bonds of
friendship were cemented in the unfair class distinctions that they had experienced during
their

undergraduate days, when they had gotten to know each other

at Dudley House, the
commuting students. The student "brown baggers" who rode the
cars to Cambridge were not accepted socially on the same terms as those

center at Harvard for

MBTA trolley

privileged to live in Harvard Yard. These ethnic and class relationships, as well as those of

gender and race, were manifested throughout the chancellor struggle.

Beneath the veneer, the role of the Irish as depicted in the media was overblown and
overplayed.

not as

It

should be noted that neither Keverian nor Fox

much a binding

factor as legislative loyalty. In the

"The only time the Irish
ices."

63

stand together

is

is Irish.

Ethnic loyalty was

words of Maurice Donahue,

during the reading of the Gospel

at

church serv-

Personally, Collins felt that he had been the victim of elitism and academic snob-

bery. Like Dukakis,

who had been jolted by

his humiliating defeat in the gubernatorial

race in 1978, Collins had learned the lessons of adversity and humility. But the taxi driver's

son suffered from more than hurt pride and a bruised ego.

He also

suffered to

some

degree from an anti-Irish bias. The blinders of ethnicity and negative stereotypes were

As Martin Nolan

of the Boston Globe told Collins afterward, "You
on your back." 64 To the Collins camp, Ylvisaker epitomized
Harvard elitism with his insistence on a terminal doctoral degree. The fact that Harvard's
president lacked such a degree merely added fuel to the fire. Much of the internal acrimony and resentment on the Board of Regents was caused by Ylvisaker 's pushing his own
friends in academia for the job. Cronyism as an issue cut both ways.
Obviously, the Collins faction misread the signs and overestimated their political
strength. Their numerical superiority may have lulled them into a false sense of security.
definitely at play.

didn't have the right stickers

Essentially, they played a political insider's

refused to back down.

Much to his credit,

game, but they met with a governor who

Collins declined to accept a "golden hand-

shake" that came in the form of a job offer

at his

alma mater.

A case can be made that if there was a conspiracy to foist Collins into the chancellorship, there

was likewise a counterconspiracy

contended that the opposition used

to

tactics that

differed on objectives, Ylvisaker and

deny

it

Minor resorted

tactics in their efforts to control the process.

to him.

The

were pejoratively
to

anti-Collins forces

political.

Although they

much the same kind of devious

Ingenious people, working hard, can always

think up ways of circumventing constraints on authority. This was likewise true of the

governor,

who in the view

of several

members of the search committee had conveyed the

impression that he wanted anybody but Collins. That the chief executive aroused heated

34

opposition

is

not surprising, for he took on the established order and offended mainstream

Democrats.

Irish

certainly rewired

If the Collins
it

phalanx wired the process for their man, the governor

for his choice.

He allowed the change precisely because he now

ac-

cepted what he had earlier rejected. Ambition for higher office often induces leading
politicians to support options that will

enhance

their electoral appeal

and strengthen

their

political alliances.

By

his opting for Jenifer, or at least

Dukakis made a

sion,

critical

by his concurring with the Board of Regents' deci-

choice and adjusted his gubernatorial campaign strategy to

conform with Massachusetts 's changing electorate. His nimble skills as a consensus poliwere severely tested. But smart politics is not the same as wise politics. The real
bone of contention between the Dukakis reformers and the Irish regulars was political
tician

control.

Seen

in this light, the Irish regulars

took a bad rap because the governor and his

fol-

lowers played the identical political game. They too were not above reproach in their
discrediting Collins and bashing Keverian.

The

latter

amounted

Moreover, no one on the governor's side was managing the

to sheer political folly.

crisis at the

Board of Regents

Lashman took over the reins. The supporting evidence indicates that Indelicato's
deceit was compounded by lackluster performances from a weak chairman and a stand-in
chancellor. Even so, the buck stops with the chief executive. After all, John Sasso and
until

Frank Keefe, along with John Duff, had warned Dukakis about Indelicato. Beyond
appointments to the Board of Regents also lacked luster.

that,

his latest

This brings us,
the positive side,
tion;

it

finally, to the
it

question of whether the struggle was worth the price.

On

forced the governor to address the problems of public higher educa-

dramatized the problem of the chancellor's salary; and

Court from capturing the Board of Regents.

it

prevented the General

On the negative side,

the relationship of the

Board of Regents to the other institutions within the system was damaged; and its struggle
for autonomy lost. The agency's credibility was not only weakened, but the legitimacy of
its governance was also undermined. Given the fragile bonds that hold the public academic enterprise

together, the viability of the

Board of Regents

itself

was called

into ques-
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At a moment of truth, Beaubien, as a political innocent, capitulated in casting the
decisive vote for Collins. With his capitulation at such a critical point, autonomy went
down the drain. But even Ylvisaker lost in the end. Both he and Beaubien were defeated
tion.

on the autonomy issue.
On balance, one can reasonably argue that a politicized search is far too high a price to
pay for the good of the commonwealth. The world of public higher education is simply too
fragile and too skittish to accept this sort of rift. The whole is bound to suffer from the
unintended consequences. This case provides ample evidence to support such an argument.

As John

Millett concludes,

"To avoid open political warfare, higher education

boards have to find some way in which to engage in political dialogue with

ment

officials."

swer

lies in

66

Otherwise the warring factions are certain

to inflict

govern-

properly managing the dichotomy of tensions between legitimate political

objectives and legitimate academic objectives. To ask for prudence

much, but

state

damage. The an-

to expect that

we can "keep politics

out of education"

is

is

perhaps asking too

to perpetuate a

myth

that invites disappointment.

power to set the
was Speaker Keverian who sponsored the correc-

In the aftermath of the controversy, the Regents were finally given the
salary of the chancellor. Surprisingly,
tive legislation in 1987.

but, perhaps

He did

more important,

it

so not only to extend a peace offering to Franklyn Jenifer

to restore his

own image and to prove his

35

critics

wrong.

.
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This was no small accomplishment.

It

added

Keverian an unlikely hero. The struggle, in

to the positive

all its

consequences and made

and poignant

rich

detail,

had swung

full cycle.

All of this seems clear in retrospect. Because of the incendiary political
it

may

not have been so clear during the heat of battle. Yet the search for a

smoke screens,
new chancellor

was exceedingly difficult and divisive in 1981 as it had been in the search for the chancelformer Board of Higher Education in 1967. From these events, along with the
details already noted, it should not have been hard to infer that trouble loomed on the
horizon in 1986. Every search has been harmed by a welter of recurring tensions. But
,

lor of the

we have

these tensions, as

Whether or not

from

that

still

will not

go away.

their affinities for the

past and permit a fair and open search remains to be seen.
chusetts will

They

seen, have their historical roots.

the actors can free themselves

One thing

remembered

certain.

is

Massa-

have to grapple with the problem of providing democratic accountability

does not threaten academic independence. Achieving

complex

institutions of higher learning to operate in a

meet difficult challenges without bowing

this goal will

political

enable the public

system in which they can

to inappropriate pressures. In the last analysis,

the future of the public university ultimately depends

on the confidence of its

citizens. £*>
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